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Abstract
We build a trade model with two countries located in di®erent time zones,
a monopolistically competitive sector in which production requires di®erentiated
goods produced using day and night labor, and shift working disutility. Consumers
choose between working at a day shift or a night shift and ¯rms may choose to
\virtually" outsource foreign day time labor by using communications services.
We found that the higher the disutility of working at night is, the smaller is the
number of varieties produced. Trade is bene¯cial only under certain concavity and
cost conditions. The higher the disutility of working at night, the larger can be the
gains from trade.
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1. Introduction
The costs of time and distance have remarkably been reduced because of the recent
development of information technology (IT). Internet, for instance, allows the instanta-
neous exchange of information by e-mail between people located thousands of miles away
from each other. Such technology creates the possibility of trade in services that take
advantage of di®erences in time zones. For example, when the workday ends to Ameri-
can workers, it starts to Indian workers. If there are e±cient communications networks
linking these two countries, services, such as call centers, can be provided to the Ameri-
can market during the night by Indian workers at their normal working hours, and vice
versa. If wages are su±ciently cheap in India, call centers providing services twenty four
hours a day in the US may opt for outsourcing such services from India and reduce costs.
Likewise, production that would take two normal working days in the US might take only
one day if half of the work is outsourced from a country located in a di®erent time zone.
In this logic, a pattern of comparative advantage arises when countries are located in
di®erent time zones as Marjit (2007) argues with a Ricadian model. Cost and time can be
saved if countries outsource production during the time their countries are not working. If
trade costs are too high than outsourcing may be not advantageous but, if trade costs are
almost inexistent, then trade is probably bene¯cial. E±cient communications networks,
as pointed out by Harris (2001), can create \virtual" mobility of factors at very low
costs. If countries are connected through communications networks, then services can be
provided by foreign labor located at a di®erent time zone and the outsourcing ¯rm can
save time (See Kikuchi, 2006).
Time, however, is related to labor supply and consumption decisions. Twenty-four-
hour services, for instance, require the supply of labor during the whole time of service
provision. Workers, however, are likely to face disutility from working at a night shift
due to various factors such as health problems, family composition, availability of services
during leisure time, etc. As a result, wages paid for day shift work and for night shift work
are supposed to di®er (Eels, 1956). Consumers will demand higher wages for working
at night1 and, if communications networks allow for virtual outsourcing of foreign labor,
then trade liberalization might be bene¯cial. This is our departure point.
The purpose of this note is to illustrate with a simple model how the introduction
of disutility caused by shift working a®ects trade patterns between countries located in
di®erent time zones. We assume the existence of shift disutility that forces consumers
to demand higher wages to supply labor at night, which, in turn, gives an incentive to
¯rms to outsource their night production. A two-country-one-sector trade model is built
featuring monopolistic competition and love of variety (Krugman, 1979). Communica-
tions networks enable countries to trade and outsource foreign labor. We conclude the
following. First, the higher the shift disutility, the higher is the shift premium and the
smaller is the number of varieties produced and the lower is welfare. Second, the liberal-
ization of trade increases the number of varieties only under a middle range of concavity
of the utility derived from the consumption of the ¯nal good and under low extra costs
incurred from outsourcing. And third, a higher shift disutility induces higher gains from
trade only if the concavity of the utility derived from the consumption of the ¯nal good is
1See Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al. (2002) for example.
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su±ciently high. We provide a very tractable framework that relates time disutility, time
zones, communications networks and trade. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is
¯rst to focus on the issue of shift working decisions in trade models.
This note is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model, in Section 3
we analyze the autarkic equilibrium and in Section 4 we analyze the free trade equilibrium
with outsourcing. Section 5 concludes this work.
2. The Model
In this section we present our basic framework. There are two identical countries,
Home and Foreign (of which variables are denoted by the superscript *), each endowed
with total amount of labor L. Each country is located in di®erent time zones, such that,
when it is day at Home it is night at Foreign and vice versa. There is one competitive
sector producing a ¯nal good. The ¯nal good is produced using intermediate di®erentiated
goods that can be produced at Home or at Foreign. Trade between countries is possible
only through communications services provided by a communications network.
2.1 Consumers
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of available time spent in labor or leisure and
derives utility U from the amount consumed of the ¯nal good, C, and from leisure time,
l. The level of utility depends, however, on the time the consumer works, i.e., the time
consumption occurs. In our model, working at night causes disutility in consumption,
thus consumers value day and night shifts di®erently in the following way:2
U =
C²
²hs
+ l 0 < ² < 1: (1)
Here, hs denotes a disutility parameter that depends on the time of work s chosen by the
consumer. A consumer can choose to work at a day shift, s = d, or at a (mid)night shift,
s = m. Denoting the price of the ¯nal good as P and the wage rate paid at shift s as ws,
the budget constraint becomes:
PC + wsl = ws: (2)
From (1) and (2) we obtain the demand function for ¯nal goods and the supply function
of labor 1¡ l, respectively:3
Cs =
µ
ws
Phs
¶ 1
1¡²
(3)
1¡ ls =
µ
ws
P (hs)
1
²
¶ ²
1¡²
: (4)
Note that both the demand for the ¯nal good and the supply of labor depend on the
wage rate and the level of disutility.
2Disutility from working at night shift includes health problems, incompatibility with leisure time of
the family, availability of services, etc. See Eels (1956) for example.
3We restrict our analysis to the case of 0 · l · 1.
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Given the optimal amount of Cs and 1¡ ls under a given wage rate ws and, consumers
choose between day and night shift based on the level of utility. Consumers prefer to work
in the shift that gives them the highest level of utility. Therefore, in order to have positive
labor supply at day and night, wage rates should be set so as to equalize the levels of
utility of day-shift and night-shift consumers, that is:
U(Cd; ld; wd) = U(Cm; lm; wm): (5)
Under the above condition, consumers are indi®erent between working at day or at night.
From (1), (3), (4) and setting hd = 1, the shift premium is, then, determined:
wm
wd
= h
1
²
m: (6)
It is intuitive to consider the disutility from working at night to be higher than that of
daytime, that is, hm > 1, thus the shift premium is always higher than one.
2.2 Production
Now let us turn to the supply side. As in Ethier (1979), the ¯nal good is produced
under constant returns to scale in a competitive sector that utilizes intermediate di®er-
entiated goods (varieties) produced under monopolistic competition. Denoting the input
of a variety i (i¤) produced at Home (Foreign) as xi (xi¤), then number of Home varieties
as n and Foreign varieties as n¤, the level of production of the ¯nal good, X, is given by
the following Dixit-Stiglitz type CES production function:
X =
Ã
nX
i=1
(xi)
µ +
n¤X
i¤=1
(xi¤)
µ
! 1
µ
; 0 < µ < 1: (7)
The price of the ¯nal good is equal to its cost of production, which depends on the price
pi of each variety i:
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P =
Ã
nX
i=1
(pi)
µ
µ¡1 +
n¤X
i¤=1
(pi¤)
µ
µ¡1
! µ¡1
µ
: (8)
We, then, derive the following demand for Home and Foreign varieties:
xi =
³pi
P
´ 1
µ¡1
X (9)
xi¤ =
³pi¤
P
´ 1
µ¡1
X: (10)
In the intermediate sector, a variety i is produced in two stages (day and night).
Producers can choose between producing domestically and outsourcing foreign labor by
paying for communications services. In the case of domestic production, each stage
requires the use of a ¯xed amount of labor ® and a variable amount of labor ¯xi.
5 The
4Under this setting, it is clear that the cost of production decreases with the number of varieties.
5Similar assumption is taken by Harris (2001), for example.
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pro¯t ¼Di of variety i producing domestically is given by:
¼Di = p
D
i xi ¡ (wd + wm)¯xi ¡ (wd + wm)®: (11)
From the above equation, the pricing rule becomes:
pDi =
(wd + wm)¯
µ
: (12)
Considering zero pro¯ts in the long run due to free entry and exit of ¯rms, we obtain the
output of variety i:
xDi =
®µ
¯(1¡ µ) : (13)
A variety can be produced by outsourcing foreign labor. Outsourcing, however, is
only possible if the ¯rm is connected to a communications network that allows trade and
\virtual" mobility of labor across countries to occur.6 Moreover, outsourcing incurs an
additional amount ¹ of labor as ¯xed cost in all stages of production.7 Only variable
inputs of labor can be outsourced, that is, labor required as ¯xed inputs need to be
domestic. Note that, in our setting, daytime labor is always cheaper than nighttime
labor in either country, thus all ¯rms would employ only daytime labor of both countries.
Since Home and Foreign are symmetric, we derive the pro¯t ¼Oi of variety i that outsources
labor and sells xi units domestically at price pi and x
¤
i units abroad at price p
¤
i :
¼Oi = pixi + p
¤
ix
¤
i ¡ (wd + w¤d)¯(xi + x¤i )¡ (wd+wm)(®+ ¹): (14)
Under free trade, the pricing rule becomes:
pOi = p
¤
i
O =
(wd + w
¤
d)¯
µ
; (15)
and the output of variety i becomes:
xOi =
(®+ ¹)µ(1 + wm)
4¯(1¡ µ) : (16)
3. The Autarkic Equilibrium
Under autarky the ¯nal good producer utilizes only Home varieties, which requires
both daytime and nighttime labor to be produced. Denoting the number of consumers
working at a day shift as Ld and consumers working at a night shift as Lm, then the
6See Harris (2001).
7The ¯xed cost coe±cient ¹ can be interpreted as the cost of connection or, for example, additional
labor employed in training, translation or coordination between headquarter and subsidiary ¯rms.
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daytime and nighttime market clearing conditions are given by:
Ld(1¡ ld) = n¯xi + n® (17)
Lm(1¡ lm) = n¯xi + n®: (18)
The total amount of labor (time) is equal to the sum of the variable and ¯xed amount of
labor demanded by each variety producer. The aggregate demand for the ¯nal good can
also be represented by:
X = LdCd + LmCm; Ld + Lm = L: (19)
Now we are ready to calculate the number of varieties under autarky, nA. Assuming
symmetric ¯rms in the intermediate sector, we obtain:8
nA =
"
L(1¡ µ)
2®
Ã
¯(1 + h
1
²
m)
µ
! ²
²¡1
# µ(1¡²)
µ¡²
: (20)
From (20) we conclude the following:
Proposition 1. The higher the disutility of working at nighttime is, the lower is the
number of varieties produced under autarky.
This stems form the fact that more shift disutility (higher hm) increases the price of
varieties and, consequently, the price of the ¯nal good. A higher ¯nal good price lowers
demand and, consequently, the number of varieties produced.
4. The Free Trade Equilibrium
Now we examine the equilibrium under free trade. As we have seen, being connected
to a communications network allows ¯nal producers in both countries to import foreign
varieties, and variety producers to outsource foreign labor. The market clearing conditions
for Home are now:
Ld(1¡ ld) = n¯(xi + x¤i ) + n¤¯(xi¤ + x¤i¤) + n(®+ ¹) (21)
Lm(1¡ lm) = n(®+ ¹): (22)
When there are no trade restrictions, the wage rate paid for day and night workers, the
price of varieties and the number of varieties produced and consumed are completely
equalized across countries and trade is balanced. Denoting the number of varieties pro-
duced at a Home under free trade as nT , we obtain:
nT =
"
L(1¡ µ)
(®+ ¹)[2 + µ(h
1
²
m ¡ 1)]
Ã
¯2
2µ¡1
µ
µ
! ²
²¡1
# µ(1¡²)
µ¡²
: (23)
8Here, we assume µ > ² to have varieties substitutes to each other. See Fukushima and Kikuchi (2009)
for details.
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Note that, under free trade, the number of varieties is also negatively related to the level
of disutility hm. Calculating the ratio of the number of varieties under autarky, nA, and
the number of total varieties under free trade, NT = 2nT , we obtain:
NT
nA
=
"
®
(®+ ¹)
£ (1 + h
1
²
m)
²
1¡²
(2 + µhm
1
² ¡ µ)
£ 2 2¡3²1¡²
# µ(1¡²)
1¡²
: (24)
The total number of varieties under free trade can be either larger or smaller than one.
The ¯rst item of the expression in parentheses is smaller than one, but if ² is large enough,
the second item can be larger than one, and if ² < 2=3, the last term is also larger than
one. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose a communications network allows two identical countries located
in di®erent time zones to trade with each other and \virtually" utilize each other's labor.
If ² < 2=3 but is su±ciently large, and costs incurred from outsourcing foreign labor
is low, then trade increases the number of varieties consumed and is bene¯cial to both
countries.
Conversely, if ² is too small, then the number of varieties consumed under free trade
is smaller than under autarky and both countries can be worth o®.
Now let us see how the disutility arising from shift work a®ects the trade equilibrium.
We log-di®erentiate (24) in relation to hm to see whether the relative number of varieties
increases or decreases:
@[lnNT=nA]
@hm
=
µ(1¡ ²)
²(µ ¡ ²)h
1¡²
²
m
"
²
(1¡ ²) £
1
(1 + h
1
²
m)
¡ 1
(2
µ
¡ 1 + h
1
²
m)
:
#
; (25)
The above equation can be positive or negative depending on the relative size of ². If
we ignore the item ²
(1¡²) , the expression in parentheses is always positive. Thus if ² is
su±ciently large, (25) is positive. We can conclude the following:
Corollary 1. If ² is su±ciently large, then the higher the disutility from working at a
night shift is, the larger are the gains from trade.
Although the number of varieties diminish with a higher hm in both autarky and trade
equilibria, the relative gains from trade can be larger with a higher hm.
5. Concluding Remarks
We built a trade model with two countries located in di®erent time zones, a monopo-
listically competitive sector, and communications network services that enable countries
to trade with each other and \virtually" outsource labor from other countries. We intro-
duced a disutility element that arises from working at night shifts so that the higher the
shift work disutility is, the higher is the night wage. We conclude that, ¯rst, the higher
the disutility of working at night is, the smaller is the number of varieties consumed in
equilibrium. Second, trade liberalization only increases the number of varieties if the
concavity of the utility derived from the consumption of the ¯nal good is not too high
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or too low, and the extra costs incurred from outsourcing is su±ciently low. Third, if
the concavity of the utility derived from the consumption of the ¯nal good is su±ciently
high, the higher the disutility of working at night, the larger are the gains from trade.
Possible extensions of the model could include more countries in di®erent time zones and
heterogeneity of tastes for shift working.
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